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Fear and Anxiety in Social Setting

An Experimental Study

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Abstract: The purpose of this study was to examine the effects of dispositional and situational factors on cognitive biases. The theoretical background was based on Kimbrel's Mediated Model of Social Anxiety, namely the revised reinforcement sensitivity theory by Gray and McNaughton. Two experiments were conducted. Study 1 (78 participants [85.9% females, aged 19–21 years]) included the induction of potential social threat, while in Study 2 (121 participants [85.1% females, aged 19–23 years]) real threat was induced. The Reinforcement Sensitivity Questionnaire was used as a measure of personality traits (Behavioral Inhibition System [BIS], Behavioral Approach System [BAS], Fight, Flight, and Freeze). Cognitive biases were assessed with the Dot Probe Task (attentional bias), Incidental Free Recall Task (memory bias), and Social Probability Cost Questionnaire (judgmental bias). The probability of occurrence of negative events was higher in the experimental group. BIS contributed positively to the prediction of probability of occurrence of negative events; and Freeze was positively related to attention bias toward pleasant stimuli. The results of the second study showed that experimentally induced circumstances of social threats did not affect cognitive biases. BIS and Freeze contributed positively to prediction of probability and distress in social context, while BIS was positively related with probability of occurrence of negative events.

Keywords: revised reinforcement sensitivity theory, social threat, potential versus real threat, cognitive biases

In its attempt to explain a wide range of behavioral outputs, 24 25 the Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory, in both its original 26 and revised versions (RST; Gray, 1987; rRST; Gray & McNaughton, 2000), has focused on the interplay between 27 28 dispositional personality factors and situational parameters 29 (constraints and affordances). RST is a biologically-based 30 theory of personality that postulates three major subsys-31 tems of the brain underlie many of the individual differ-32 ences seen in cognitive, emotional, and motivational 33 reactions. Corr and McNaughton (2012) highlighted that the reinforcing properties of inputs are dependent on a pro-34 35 cess of evaluation. According to Gray's RST (Gray, 1987) 36 there are three emotional systems: Behavioral Approach 37 System (BAS), Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS), and 38 Fight-Flight System (FFS). BAS is responsible for activation 39 of behavior toward incentives. BIS is related to avoidance of 40 conditioned aversive stimuli, while FFS is related to avoid-41 ance of unconditioned aversive stimuli. BIS and BAS are 42 related to anxiety and impulsivity (Gray, 1981; Pickering, 43 Corr, & Gray, 1999), while FFS is related to aggressiveness 44 (Mitrović, Smederevac, & Čolović, 2008). In the revised 45 model (Gray & McNaughton, 2000), the systems were 46 modified: the expanded Fight-Flight-Freeze System (FFFS) 47 is now responsive to all punishing and threatening stimuli; 48 whereas the BIS is no sensitive to goal conflict (of all kinds)

it is engaged in direction of attention to conflicting stimuli,
and has the task of attempting to resolve conflict by inhibiting ongoing action and biasing action toward the FFFS to
facilitate defensive behavior (Gray & McNaughton,
2000). The BAS is now sensitive to all forms of rewarding
(including relieving) stimuli.

Cognitive biases refer to the selective processing of 55 emotionally relevant information (Mineka & Tomarken, 56 1989). Biased cognitive processing is related to different 57 stages of information processing (e.g., perception, attention, 58 59 memory, judgment, interpretation) as well as to different types of stimuli (negative or threatening stimuli, positive 60 or pleasant stimuli). Bias occurring in the processing of 61 information on social danger plays an important role in 62 social anxiety experience. In socially-anxious individuals, 63 bias in attention implies directions of attention toward 64 threat during early, automatic stages of processing, whereas 65 during later stages of processing, this type of bias includes 66 direction of attention away from threat (Amir, Foa, & Coles, 67 1998). Memory bias refers to encoding, memorizing, and 68 recalling negative or positive stimuli. Socially-anxious 69 individuals exhibit memory biases for threatening social 70 information (Mansell & Clark, 1999). Judgmental bias 71 refers to the overestimation of the costs and/or probability 72 73 of a negative event (Foa, Franklin, Perry, & Herbert, 1996).

Foa and Kozak (1986) proposed that social fears are characterized by high negative valence (cost) for social scrutiny
and criticism as well as overestimation of their likelihood
(probability).

78 To date, few studies have addressed the problem of the 79 specific impacts of situational factors and personality traits on a wider range of cognitive biases. Conceptual differ-80 ences between the original and the revised RST (rRST; 81 82 Corr, 2008), as well as the multitude of cognitive biases 83 that have to be taken into account, add to the complexity of this task. There are still no conclusive answers to a 84 85 number of questions concerning the relations between situ-86 ational factors such as potential and real threats, disposi-87 tions (personality traits), and cognitive biases - namely, 88 attention, memory, and judgmental biases.

89 Cognitive Biases – The Original

90 Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory

91 Perspective

92 The studies stemming from the original RST point to signif-93 icant relations between personality traits and cognitive biases, consistent with the "trait-congruency hypothesis" 94 95 (Rusting, 1998). According to this conceptual framework, 96 the behavioral approach system (BAS) is positively related 97 to cognitive biases toward pleasant stimuli, while the behav-98 ioral inhibition system (BIS) predicts biases toward unpleasant or threatening stimuli. A number of authors (Carver & 99 100 White, 1994; Gray, 1981, 1987; Tellegen, 1985; Tomarken 101 & Keener, 1998; Watson, Wiese, Vaidya, & Tellegen, 1999) 102 suggest that BIS and BAS are related to positive and negative 103 affectivity, and thus related to selective processing of emo-104 tionally relevant stimuli. It has been shown that the BAS is 105 positively related to positive memory biases, and BIS to neg-106 ative memory bias (Gomez, Cooper, McOrmond, & Tatlow, 107 2004; Gomez & Gomez, 2002). The results of some less 108 recent studies, not stemming from the RST framework, support the notion that anxiety is related to negative memory 109 bias (Breck & Smith, 1983; Claeys, 1989; Cloitre & Liebowitz, 110 1991; Eysenck & Byrne, 1994; O'Banion & Arkowitz, 1977). 111

112 A number of studies explored the relations between the BIS and attentional biases, but this has proved inconclusive. 113 114 For example, there is evidence that the BIS does not corre-115 late with attentional biases (Putman, Hermans, & van Honk, 2004), and also that it is negatively correlated with 116 117 the propensity to divert attention away from negative stim-118 uli (Avila & Torrubia, 2008). Some studies do indicate that 119 anxious individuals show attentional bias to threatening 120 stimuli and that this phenomenon is less typical of non-121 anxious persons (e.g., Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, 122 Bakermans-Kranenburg, & Van Ijzendoorn, 2007; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996).123Avila and Parcet (2002) suggested that, in anxious individuals, anterior attentional network is activated by noninformative threat-related stimuli – an effect which does not1240ccur in non-anxious individuals. This finding points to1261271271281280ctur the BIS and attention processes.129

Based on Gray's and McNaughton's work (Gray & 130 McNaughton, 2000), Kimbrel (2008) assumed that the 131 cognitive biases for negative stimuli are caused by height-132 ened BIS sensitivity. Therefore, it is expected that judgmen-133 tal bias or perception of threat would be positively related to 134 BIS and FFFS under conditions of social threat. Results of 135 previous research (e.g., Kimbrel, 2009; Kimbrel, Nelson-136 Grav, & Mitchell, 2012) are consistent with this hypothesis. 137 Namely, BIS sensitivity is positively correlated with percep-138 tion of threat, while BAS is negatively related to perception 139 140 of threat.

The Revised Reinforcement Sensitivity141Theory Perspective142

Within the revised RST, social situations have been 143 recognized as particularly relevant triggers of neuropsycho-144 logical systems' activity. Some social situations comprise a 145 combination of potential reward and punishment (i.e., 146 approach-avoidance conflict; Gray & McNaughton, 2003) 147 such as situations of social interaction (e.g., conversation 148 with attractive person), which if sufficiently intense should 149 lead to the activation of the BIS. Besides the approach-150 avoidance conflict, some social situations (e.g., public speak-151 ing) include actual threats to a person's self-esteem and, 152 thus, can trigger the activity of the fight/flight/freeze system 153 (FFFS; i.e., fear-related reactions; Smederevac, Mitrović, 154 Čolović, & Nikolašević, 2014). Gray and McNaughton 155 (2000) suggest that majority of specific phobias do not stem 156 from classical conditioning, but rather from unconditioned 157 reactions to innate fear stimuli, which include elevated 158 activity of the FFFS. Supporting this distinction, Kimbrel 159 (2008) pointed to the distinction between two classes of 160 social situations, namely the "innate anxiety stimuli" and 161 "innate fear stimuli." The former imply the approach-avoid-162 ance conflict, while the latter comprise high likelihood of 163 negative evaluation along with the low likelihood of reward, 164 provoking reactions of fear (Kimbrel, 2008). However, the 165 specific effects of situational and dispositional features on 166 cognitive biases have not explored in any detail yet. 167

Judgmental bias, in particular, is considered to be one of crucial factors in the development and maintenance of social anxiety (e.g., Rapee & Heimberg, 1997; Rheingold, Herbert, & Franklin, 2003). Results have shown that

172 socially anxious individuals tend to overestimate the likelihood and potential consequences of negative social events 173 (e.g., Amir, Beard, & Bower, 2005; Foa et al., 1996; Poulton 174 & Andrews, 1996; Rheingold et al., 2003; Smári, 175 176 Pétursdóttir, & Porsteinsdóttir, 2001; Zou & Abbott, 2012). Attentional bias for negative social information 177 implies selective direction of attention toward the threat 178 179 (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 180 1986; Mogg & Bradley, 1998); and results point to selective direction of attention to threatening social information in 181 socially anxious individuals (Chen, Ehlers, Clark, & 182 Mansell, 2002; Mogg & Bradley, 2002; Mogg, Philippot, 183 & Bradley, 2004; Pishyar, Harris, & Menzies, 2004; Sposari 184 185 & Rapee, 2007). The results of a study by Amir, Foa, and Coles (2000) suggest that memory biases in word recall 186 187 and word memorizing occur in socially anxious participants. 188 However, although studies (not necessarily stemming from rRST) have demonstrated the relevance of social situations 189 for several classes of cognitive biases, the results are not 190 191 thoroughly consistent. Kimbrel (2009) found that atten-192 tional bias is not significantly related to other variables in the model, including BIS and BAS sensitivity (conceptual-193 194 ized according to the original RST). However, a number of empirical findings suggest that attention bias is related 195 to dispositional features (e.g., Amir & Foa, 2001; 196 Asmundson & Stein, 1994; Becker, Rinck, Margraf, & Roth, 197 2001; Hope, Rapee, Heimberg, & Dombeck, 1990; Lundh 198 & Öst, 1996; Mattia, Heimberg, & Hope, 1993), as well as 199 to hypersensitivity of the amygdala (Fox, Hane, & Pine, 200 201 2007; Hariri et al., 2005). These inconsistencies may, at 202 least partly, be attributed to methodological factors. 203 To examine attention, Kimbrel used verbal stimuli, which 204 can decrease the ecological validity of the data. Images of human faces with specific emotional expressions are con-205 sidered to be more appropriate stimuli than verbal material 206 in studies of relations between attentional processes and 207 emotions (Calamaras, 2010; Kindt & Brosschot, 1997). 208 209 Besides being more ecologically valid (Foa & Kozak, 1986; Lang, 1979), visual stimuli do not trigger semantic 210 information processing, and thus do not cause the 211 confounding of semantic and attentional processes 212 213 (Weierich, Treat, & Hollingworth, 2008). One of Kimbrel's methodological recommendations is to use dot-probe tasks 214 215 for the estimation of attentional biases (Kimbrel, 2009).

216 Current Study – Conceptual 217 and Methodological Issues

218 Kimbrel et al.'s study (2012) is so far the only one that 219 offers a more detailed insight into the relations between RST constructs, perception of threat, and cognitive biases. 220 However, several issues still remain unresolved. Kimbrel's 221 (2008) model includes cognitive biases as mediators 222 between traits and socially anxious reactions, and thus 223 does not directly respond to the issue of effects of situa-224 tional and dispositional features on cognitive processes. 225 The results (Kimbrel et al., 2012) show positive effect of 226 BIS-FFFS sensitivity on cognitive bias, as well as the 227 negative effect of BAS. However, the specific impacts of 228 BIS and FFFS were not examined. Perception of threat 229 was shown to load on the same latent dimension as several 230 cognitive biases, but the actual effects of different kinds of 231 threat (actual vs. potential) were not investigated (Kimbrel 232

et al., 2012). 233 The current study attempts to address the problem of 234 particular effects of situational features (potential and 235 actual social threats) and personality traits (rRST con-236 structs) on three classes of cognitive biases: memory, atten-237 tional, and judgmental biases. The study builds on Kimbrel 238 et al.'s (2012) work both in conceptual and methodological 239 respects. Namely, the conceptual framework of these 240 studies is the Mediated Model of Social Anxiety (MMSA; 241 Kimbrel, 2009; Kimbrel et al., 2012) which is based on 242 Gray's reinforcement sensitivity theory. MMSA is unique 243 because it integrates a different factor (e.g., personality, 244 environmental, cognitive) into a unified model. Because 245 MMSA has not yet been tested extensively and research 246 on this model has emerged in recent years (Kimbrel, 247 2009; Kimbrel et al., 2012; Randelović, 2016), the purpose 248 of the present study is to provide an initial investigation 249 into new aspects of the model. One of the basic assump-250 tions of MMSA is that cognitive biases would be most 251 pronounced under conditions of social threat because 252 these conditions should activate defensive systems of 253 personality (BIS and FFFS; Kimbrel, 2008). However, the 254 design of Kimbrel's study, which is correlative in nature, 255 limits a direct test of the mentioned hypothesis. As theoret-256 ical and empirical data predicted, cognitive biases would be 257 emerged under different social circumstances. Hence, the 258 main goals in this study are: (1) to examine the effects of 259 BIS, BAS, FFFS, and potential social threaten biases in 260attention, memory, and judgment and (2) to examine the 261 effects of BIS, BAS, FFFS, and actual social threat on biases 262 in attention, memory, and judgment. In Study 1 we 263 assumed that (a) the potential social threat would have 264 significant effect on judgmental biases. Specifically, assess-265 ment of probability of occurrence of negative events 266 and distress would be higher in the group who faced 267 potential social threat than the control group. We assumed 268 that there are no significant effects of potential social threat 269 on biases in attention and memory, which is consistent 270 with the results of some previous studies (e.g., Finucane, 271 Whiteman, & Power, 2010; Mansell & Clark, 1999); 272 (b) BIS and FFFS would have significant effects on biases in attention, memory, and judgment. In Study 2 our hypotheses are as follows: (a) there are no significant effects of actual social threat on cognitive processing (attention, memory, and judgment); (b) BIS and FFFS would have significant effects on biases in attention, memory, and judgment.

280 The novel aspects of this research in comparison with 281 Kimbrel et al.'s study (2012) are: (a) application of 282 experimental research design; (b) examination of the 283 effects of important situational factors, specially examination of the effects of actual social threat which employed 284 285 different valences of nonverbal feedback (negative, posi-286 tive, and neutral) given by the professors; (c) using rRST, 287 and (d) assessing attention bias with dot-probe task. Thus, 288 to examine the effect of situational factors on cognitive 289 biases, we employed two experimental procedures which 290 included potential and actual social threat. In order to 291 address the issue of effects of personality traits, we included 292 the measures of rRST constructs. In order to avoid con-293 founds and to ensure better ecological validity, several 294 methodological recommendations made by Kimbrel were 295 also adopted, such as the use of dot-probe task, and the 296 use of nonverbal measures of attentional biases (pictures 297 of human faces expressing emotions of joy and fear; 298 Calamaras, 2010; Kindt & Brosschot, 1997). According to 299 the theoretical framework and the results of previous 300 studies (Gray & McNaughton, 2003; Kimbrel et al., 2012), 301 positive effects of BIS on cognitive biases may be expected 302 in a situation of potential social threat, while positive effects 303 of FFFS are more likely to occur in a situation of actual 304 threat. According to the theoretical framework and 305 the results of previous studies (Gray & McNaughton, 306 2003; Kimbrel et al., 2012), positive effects of BIS on cognitive biases may be expected in a situation of potential 307 308 social threat (Experiment 1), while positive effects of FFFS 309 are more likely to occur in a situation of actual threat 310 (Experiment 2).

311 Experiment 1


312 Participants

The sample of 118 first and second year psychology students from the Faculty of Philosophy in Novi Sad (83.1% females), took part in the experimental phase of the study (the initial phase included gathering of demographic and questionnaire data). Participants were randomly assigned to conditions (experimental and control group). After the experimental phase of the study, 8 (9.4%) participants who "saw through" the experimental situation 320 were excluded, while 20 (23.6%) participants were 321 excluded due to an extensive number of errors (above 322 15%; according to previous research, e.g., Dinić, 2014) on 323 the dot-probe task, and additional 12 (14.6%) due to incom-324 plete data. Thus 78 participants (85.9% females), aged 325 19-25 years (M = 20.03, SD = 1) were included in the final 326 327 sample. Each group included 39 participants. The groups did not differ with respect to gender ($\chi^2_{(1)} = .43; p = .52$), 328 or year of study ($\chi^2_{(1)} = .43$; p = .52). Groups did not differ 329 significantly with respect to personality traits (BIS: 330 $t_{(73)} = 1.52; p = .13;$ BAS: $t_{(73)} = -1.13; p = .26;$ Fight: $t_{(73)} = -1.13; p = .26;$ 331 .48; p = .63; Flight: $t_{(73)} = -.66$; p = .51; Freeze: $t_{(73)} = 1.15$; 332 p = .26). There were no multivariate outliers, while 17 uni-333 variate outliers ($z > \pm 2.50$) were retained due to relatively 334 small size of the groups. The participants provided written 335 consent to participate in the study. The study was 336 approved by the Departmental Ethical Committee (date: 337 May 27th, 2014). 338

In order to estimate the optimal sample size for the 339 experiment, a priori power analysis was conducted in 340 G*Power 3.1.9.2 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 341 2007), according to recommendations by Dattalo (2008). 342 Tests for multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) 343 global effects (F tests), adjusted for MANCOVA, were 344 performed. The results showed that, with two groups, 345 five covariates, and five response variables, assuming 346 $\alpha = .05$, in order to detect an effect of medium size 347 (f'(U) = .15) with 80% power, total sample size of N = 49348 would be needed, with f_c (30, 154) = 1.53, λ = 29.4, Wilks 349 U = .57.350

In order to check effectiveness of experimental manipu-351 lation the state of anxiety was assessed with the state 352 353 version of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (State-Trait Anxiety Inventory for Adults - STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch 354 & Lushene, 1970; Spielberger, in preparation [Authorsen] 355 add to references list]). The results show that there are 356 357 significant effects of experimental manipulation on state of anxiety. Assessment of level of anxiety is higher in the 358 group who faced potential social threat than the control 359 group (experimental group: M = 2.58; SD = 0.66; control 360 group: M = 1.90; SD = 0.65; $t_{(76)} = 4.572$; p < .001). In debrief-361 ing phase, participants who "saw through the experimen-362 tal situation" informed experimenter that they didn't 363 believe in experimental manipulation. All of them were in 364 experimental group. Results show that participants who 365 "saw through the experimental situation" have lower level 366 of anxiety (M = 1.75; SD = 0.79) in comparison with 367 experimental group ($t_{(45)} = 3.145$; p < .001), while there 368 was no difference between first mentioned group and 369 control group ($t_{(45)} = .592$; p = .557). This result indicates 370 how far the experimental manipulation did not work. 371





Fi 1. The trial timing of dot probe task.

372 Measures

The Reinforcement Sensitivity Questionnaire (RSQ; Smederevac et al., 2014)

375 The questionnaire was designed as a measure of the revised 376 Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory constructs. In the initial 377 and subsequent studies, the scale showed adequate internal 378 and convergent validity (Krupić, Corr, Ručević, Križanić, & 379 Gračanin, 2016; Smederevac et al., 2014). The question-380 naire consists of 29 items with 4-point rating scales ranging 381 from 1 (= completely disagree) to 4 (= completely agree): BIS (7 items; item example: "I often worry that I may be criti-382 383 cized"), BAS (6 items; item example: "I readily accept new and exciting situations"), Fight (6 items; item example: 384 "Whenever I am attacked, I fight back without hesitation"), 385 Flight (5 items; "Whenever I am in a dangerous situation, 386 387 I do my best to get out of it"), and Freeze (5 items; item example: "I tend to "freeze" in threatening situations"). 388

389 Dot Probe Task (DPT)

390 The Dot Probe Task is a measure of attention biases by 391 means of reaction time (RT). The task applied in this study 392 was developed according to procedures applied in previous 393 studies (e.g., Calamaras, 2010; Mogg & Bradley, 1999; 394 Tran, Lamplmayr, Pintzinger, & Pfabigan, 2013). The tasks 395 consisted of 150 picture stimuli acquired from the 396 Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces (KDEF) base 397 (Lundqvist, Flykt, & Öhman, 1998). The choice of stimuli 398 was made according to the original KDEF validation study 399 (Goeleven, De Raedt, Leyman, & Verschuere, 2008). The pictures show 50 models (25 females and 25 males, aged 400 20-30 years), whose faces were photographed in three 401 different emotional expressions: anger, joy, and neutral. 402 403 Therefore, there were 50 pictures with threatening facial 404 expressions, 50 with joyful expressions, and 50 neutral. 405 Experimental trials involved paired pictures, whereby each picture of anger/joy was paired with a neutral picture. The 406 overall procedure included 250 trials. Each pair of pictures 407 (anger - neutral and joyful - neutral) was presented twice 408 (on the left and on the right side of the screen), adding 409 up to 200 trials. Besides these, there were 50 filler trials 410 consisting of neutral/neutral pairs. The pictures were 411 presented on the computer one next to another, while the 412 sequence of pictures was randomized for each participant. 413 Before each trial, a focal stimulus ("+") appeared in the 414 center of the screen, and the stimulus followed 500 ms 415 later. The exposition of stimuli lasted 500 ms (see Figure 1). 416 The dot retrieval took place immediately after the disap-417 pearance of the stimulus. The dot was exposed for 418 1,100 ms. The dot appeared the same number of times 419 on the left and on the right side of the screen. Thus the 420 dot was once on the side of a valent (emotionally charged) 421 stimulus (congruent, RTC trials), and the second time on 422 the side of a neutral stimulus (incongruent, RTI trials). Bias 423 indexes (BI) for threatening and pleasant stimuli were 424 calculated, according to the formula BI = RTI - RTC (Tran 425 et al., 2013). The positive BI score points to higher bias, 426 more precisely to more pronounced direction of attention 427 to stimuli of certain valence (attention vigilance). The oppo-428 site case points to diverting of attention, in other words to 429 diverting from further processing the information. 430

The Incidental Free Recall Task (IFRT)

432 This task assesses memory bias by the average number of memorized words of positive/negative valence. There were 433 38 words in total, split into three lists to control for serial 434 position effect (Kimbrel et al., 2012), whereby 30 words 435 were stimuli (15 positive and 15 negative), while 8 words 436 (4 positive and 4 negative) served as "buffers." The buffers 437 were presented at the beginning/end of each list, in order 438 to control for the effect of the serial position (the position 439 of the word in the list). The buffers were not used in the 440




Figure 2. The trial timing of incidental free recall task.

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485 had not thus far been applied to the Serbian population, a validation study was conducted, which showed that the 486 measure had satisfactory validity, reliability, representative-487 ness, and homogeneity (Randelović & Randelović, 2014). 488

Procedure

490 Two weeks prior to the experimental procedure, participants completed the personality assessment measures. 491 The experimental procedure included the induction of 492 potential social threat, namely the "Bogus-speech threat 493 manipulation" (BSTM), which was designed in accordance 494 with similar procedures applied in previous studies (e.g., 495 Lee & Telch, 2008; Singh, 2011). Participants were ran-496 497 domly assigned to two experimental conditions. In both groups, participants' task was to write up a design of an 498 experimental study on a chosen topic (Violence, Corruption, 499 and Proneness to risky behavior). Task completion time 500 was limited to 10 min. Both groups were informed that 501 the study designs will be rated by a three-member commit-502 tee, consisting of university teachers. In the Experimental 503 Group, the participants were additionally "required" to give 504 oral presentations of their designs before the committee. 505 In the Control Group, there was no such requirement. 506 Upon the completion of the written part of the task, study 507 designs were "forwarded" to the committee, while the 508 participants completed the computer-administered tasks 509 and the questionnaires. After the dependent variables 510 were assessed, written and oral debriefing was given to 511 participants. 512

Results

Multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) was used 514 in order to examine the relations between the independent 515 variables (experimental conditions and personality traits) 516 on cognitive biases. Experimental condition (two levels: oral 517 or no-oral presentation) was the categorical predictor, and 518 factor scores on rRSQ dimensions were continuous predic-519 tors. The following cognitive bias indexes were entered as 520 dependent variables: two measures of judgmental biases 521 (likely cost associated with the upcoming negative events, 522 and probability that the event will happen), two indexes 523 of attention biases (attention biases for threatening and 524

statistical analyses (Mansell & Clark, 1999). The three word 442 lists were assembled taking into account the condition that 443 there are no more than two negative or positive words in a 444 row (Mansell & Clark, 1999). According to recommenda-445 tions from previous studies (Kimbrel et al., 2012), the cate-446 gories of words of different valence were equal with regard 447 to word length and frequency. The choice of words was 448 based on the results of a pilot study where negative words 449 (related to social anxiety and low social achievement) were 450 detected, as well as the positive words which denoted social achievement and social success. Within each block, the 451 words were shown on the screen in sequence. In the 452 453 "encoding phase," the participant's task was to estimate whether the words describe the way that others see and 454 455 estimate them during public appearances (by pressing the left mouse button for yes, and right for no). This phase 456 457 was followed by a 2-minute cognitive distraction, where 458 the procedure by Breck and Smith (1983) was applied. 459 The participants were asked to mark ("strike through") 460 letter E on a sheet of paper where letters were printed in 461 a random order. Upon the end of this task, the participants 462 were asked to write as many words as they remembered 463 from the encoding phase, regardless of the order in which 464 the words were shown. This phase lasted 4 min (see Figure 2). Within blocks, the list of words and the letter that 465 had to be marked were varied, while the memory task was 466 the same. The index of negative memory bias was calcu-467 468 lated by subtracting the number of positive words from 469 the number of negative words. Negative scores point to memory bias toward negative words (Kimbrel, 2009; 470 471 Matthews, Mogg, May, & Eysenck, 1989).

The Social Probability Cost Questionnaire (SPCQ; 472 473 McManus, Clark, & Hackmann, 2000)

474 The SPCQ is a measure of judgmental biases, and com-475 prises two 33-item scales. On a scale from 0 to 100, the 476 participants rate how bad or disturbing each of the given 477 social events (in the near future) can be for them (0 = not)478 at all bad, 100 = really bad), as well as how likely each of the 479 events is to happen to them (0 = not at all likely, 100 = almost480 sure to happen). The items describe social events like being 481 criticized, saying something stupid, beginning to stutter, 482 opinion will be ridiculed, and so forth. Both scales have 483 shown satisfactory internal consistency ($\alpha = .96$; $\alpha = .97$) 484 in a study by McManus et al. (2000). Given that the SPCQ

						SPCQ -	SPCQ -			
Variable	BIS	BAS	Fight	Flight	Freeze	cost	probability	AB – th	AB – pl	NMBI
BAS	51***									
Fight	.07	.17								
Flight	.34**	14	10							
Freeze	.64***	23*	02	.52***						
SPCQ - cost	.41***	22*	.11	.18	.28*					
SPCQ – probability	.30**	13	.22	.03	.24*	.63***				
AB – th	11	.11	08	17	24*	01	.11			
AB – pl	.09	.07	.11	02	.26*	.10	.09	24*		
NMBI	23*	.06	05	03	11	18	14	13	05	
Μ	2.20	2.75	2.3	2.72	1.90	32.23	34.27	-0.65	0.31	-0.67
SD	0.61	0.55	0.59	0.55	0.63	16.26	15.89	25.44	24.42	2.31
α	.82	.78	.76	.61	.79	.94	.94			

Table 1. Experiment 1: Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations (Pearson correlations; two-tailed) [Author: please check added zeros in front of the dots (e.g., for the values of M and SD)]

Notes. N = 78. BAS = Behavioral Approach System; BIS = Behavioral Inhibition System; SPCQ - cost = judgmental bias - assessment of cost (negative impact) of events in near future; SPCQ - probability = judgmental bias - assessment of likelihood of negative events in near future; AB - th = attention bias toward threatening stimuli; AB - pl = attention bias toward pleasant stimuli; NMBI = Negative Memory Bias. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. [Author: all two-tailed?]

pleasant stimuli), and an index of negative memory bias.
For the grouping variable (experimental condition),
deviation coding was applied.

Bivariate correlations (Table 1) show strong positive correlations between BIS and Freeze, Flight, and Freeze, as well as between two modalities of judgmental bias. BIS and BAS correlated moderately and negatively.

532 MANCOVA (Table 2) suggests that the set of independent 533 variables explained a substantial amount of the variance of 534 SPCQ – cost (p < .05) and SPCQ – probability (p < .05). BIS 535 was the only factor to significantly (and positively) contribute to the prediction of SPCQ - cost. Experimental condition 536 predicted the score on SPCQ - probability, whereby the 537 experimental group scored significantly higher than the con-538 539 trol group ($M_{exp} = 36.21$; $M_{cont} = 28.24$; $F_{(1)} = 4.20$, p < .05). 540 Freeze contributed significantly and positively to the prediction of attention bias toward pleasant stimuli. 541

542 Behavioral parameters for attentional bias (response 543 times - RT) are showed in Tables 3 and 4.

544 **Discussion**

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545 The results provide support for both the assumption that 546 situational features affect cognitive biases, and for Gray's 547 hypothesis that BIS contributes to the perception of poten-548 tial dangers. The results indicate that the assessment of probability of occurrence of negative events and distress 549 550 is higher in the group who faced potential social threat. This 551 result is consistent with the assumptions, supported by both the rRST (Gray & McNaughton, 2003) and Kimbrel's 552 553 model (2008) that the situational feature triggers the

perception of social threats. The activating event (the antic-
ipation of public exposure), launches the "cognitive scheme554of danger," which is the basis for increased alertness.556

Regardless of the experimental manipulation, BIS is 557 responsible for the anticipation of negative outcomes in 558 new and ambiguous situations (Corr, 2011; Gray & 559 McNaughton, 2003). The results indicate that BIS as a 560 dispositional factor, shapes the estimation of occurrence 561 of negative outcomes in new situations. With regard to 562 the characteristics of the experimental manipulation, it 563 may be important to point out that the situation did signif-564 icantly differ from the usual circumstances that the partic-565 ipants were accustomed to during course practical. Namely, 566 it is possible that the work on a new task itself (preparation 567 of speech) did contribute to the overall perception of 568 tension among participants. 569

Experimentally induced potential social threat did not 570 affect either attention or memory biases. This result is in 571 line with recent studies, which report that different quality 572 of induced affects (e.g., happiness and sadness) has no 573 effect on the various aspects of attention (alertness, orienta-574 tion, and selectivity; Finucane et al., 2010). The only effect 575 that is registered in the domain of attention bias is the 576 effect of Freeze on attention bias toward positive stimuli. 577 Although there is a possibility that this effect is an artifact, 578 this result may point to the tendency of people scoring high 579 on Freeze to focus their attention on pleasant stimuli. 580 Namely, a person can revert to the mechanisms that would 581 enable a "getaway" from a new and potentially demanding 582 situation. In light of these results, this mechanism may 583 point to positive information as the distraction in potentially 584 threatening situations. 585

	SPCQ - cost	SPCQ – probability	AB – th	AB – pl	NMBI	
Variable	Β (β)	Β (β)	Β (β)	Β (β)	Β (β)	
BIS	8.69 (.33)*	4.12 (.16)	7.87 (.19)	-3.97 (10)	-1.28 (34)	
BAS	-1.1 (04)	-0.91 (03)	6.55 (.14)	3.17 (.07)	-0.27 (06)	
Fight	2.54 (.09)	5.37 (.20)	-5.46 (13)	4.05 (.10)	-0.08 (02)	
Flight	2.72 (.09)	-1.82 (06)	-3.78 (08)	-8.84 (20)	0.3 (.07)	
Freeze	-0.14 (01)	3.62 (.14)	-11.34 (28)	17.28 (.45)*	0.09 (.02)	
EC	3.04 (.19)	3.56 (.23)*	-1.47 (06)	-0.39 (02)	0.51 (.22)	
R^2	.21	.19	.09	.13	.11	
Adj. R ²	.15	.13	.01	.05	.03	
F _(1,71)	3.22	2.84	1.19	1.72	1.41	
ECexper.						
М	36.21	38.87	-2.71	1.19	-0.28	
SD	15.63	15.83	26.28	29.39	2.23	
SE	2.50	2.53	4.21	4.71	0.36	
ECcontr.						
М	28.24	29.67	1.41	-0.58	-1.05	
SD	16.08	14.76	24.75	18.52	2.34	
SE	2.57	2.36	3.96	2.97	0.37	
Total						
М	32.23	34.27	0.65	0.31	-0.67	
SD	16.25	15.89	25.44	24.42	2.31	
SE	1.84	1.80	2.88	2.76	0.26	

Table 2. Experiment 1: Results of MANCOVA [Author: (1) se check, if edits of values and Note are correct. (2) Std.	was replaced with
SE, correct?]	

Notes. N = 78. BIS = Behavioral Inhib (potential data): Adj. $R^2 = [$ **do we need a e ation here?**]; F = [**do we need a e ation here?**]; F = [**do we need a e ation here?**]; F = [**do we need a e ation here?**]; F = [**do we need a explanation**]; ECexper. = [**Auhtor: please provide explanation**]; SPCQ - cost = judgmental bias - assessment of cost (negative impact) of events in near future; SPCQ probability = judgmental bias - assessment of likelihood of negative events in near future; AB - th = attention bias toward threatening stimuli; AB - pl = attention bias toward pleasant stimuli; NMBI = Negative Memory Bias; SPCQ - cost, SPCQ - probability, AB - th, AB - pl, NMBI as dependent variables; B = unstandardized regression coefficients; β = standardized regression coefficients. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. [**Author: are p values one- or two-tailed**?]

Table 3. Experiment 1: Behavioral parameters for attentional bias (response times – RT)[Author: please check if edits in values for M and Ku are correct, zeros in front added.]

Attentional bias		Min	Max	М	SD	Sk	Ku
RT	RTC_anger	289.83	558.45	392.19	58.29	.331	-0.232
	RTI_anger	275.28	577.36	391.54	61.89	.586	0.268
	RTC_joy	272.19	555.91	392.39	59.26	.387	-0.197
	RTI_joy	278.44	528.72	392.70	62.08	.309	-0.589
	RT_neutral	352.91	640.91	484.79	74.56	.215	-0.696
Bias indexes	BI_anger	-52.80	58.15	-0.65	25.44	.013	-0.197
	BI_joy	-67.29	69.39	0.31	24.42	282	1.194

Notes. N = 78. RT = Response Times; RTC_anger = congruent trials for threatening stimuli; RTI_anger = incongruent trials for threatening stimuli; RTC_joy = congruent trials for pleasant stimuli; RTI_joy = incongruent trials for pleasant stimuli; RT_neutral = responses times for neutral stimuli; Bl_anger = bias indexes for threatening stimuli; Bl_joy = bias indexes for pleasant [Author: edit correct? was Ku = Kurtosis. [Author: provide significance of bold value]

586 Experiment 2

587 Participants

588At the end of Phase 1 of the study, during which demo-589graphic and questionnaire data were gathered, the sample

comprised 169 students of the first and second years from590the Faculty of Philosophy in Niš. A total of 150 participants591took part in the experimental phase of the study. Four participants withdrew during the write-up of draft speeches, while593additional four withdrew in the later stages of the study.594The data of 21 (31.5%) participants were excluded from the595

	Attentional bias	Group	Min	Max	М	SD	Sk	Ku
RT	RTC_anger	E	293.01	507.28	396.27	53.65	.236	-0.308
		K	289.83	558.45	388.10	63.02	.455	-0.120
	RTI_anger	E	275.28	545.92	393.56	61.51	.552	0.237
		K	292.76	577.36	389.52	63.01	.648	0.509
	RTC_joy	E	272.19	527.68	398.14	59.14	.228	-0.259
		K	290.54	555.91	386.64	59.59	.573	0.142
	RTI_joy	E	305.83	528.72	399.33	59.75	.470	-0.327
		K	278.44	525.94	386.06	64.40	.246	-0.820
	RT_neutral	E	357.86	633.36	491.07	71.60	.142	-0.616
		K	352.91	640.91	478.50	77.83	.323	-0.667
Bias indexes	Bl_anger	E	-52.80	58.15	-2.71	26.28	.334	0.058
		K	-47.83	52.44	1.41	24.75	336	-0.122
	BI_joy	E	-67.29	69.39	1.19	29.39	430	0.584
		K	-44.09	55.33	-0.58	18.52	.140	1.395

Notes. $N_E = 39$; $N_K = 39$. RT = Response Times; RTC_anger = congruent trials for threatening stimuli; RTI_anger = incongruent trials for threatening stimuli; RTC_joy = congruent trials for pleasant stimuli; RT_neutral = responses times for neutral stimuli; Bl_anger = bias indexes for threatening stimuli; BL_joy = bias indexes for pleasant stimuli; E = experimental group; K = control group; Sk = Skewness: Ku = Kurtosis. **[Author: please check added Explanations and zeros in values of M and Ku; also provide the significance of bold values in Table**

596 analyses: 14 (21%) failed to complete the entire set of mea-597 sures administered in the study, 3 (4.5%) claimed that they "saw through" the experimental manipulation, 3 (4.5%) 598 599 were univariate outliers ($z > \pm 2.50$), and 1 (1.5%) multivariate 600 outlier (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Therefore, the final sample comprised 121 participants (103 [85.1%] female), 601 602 aged 19-23 years (M = 19.80, SD = 0.78). Experimental and control groups are equal with respect to gender ($\chi^2_{(2)}$ = 603 1.44, p = .49) and year of study ($\chi^2_{(2)} = .90, p = .64$). The par-604 ticipants were randomly assigned to groups. The groups do 605 not differ with regard to personality traits – BIS: $F_{(2,118)}$ = 606 607 .07; p = .93; BAS: $F_{(2,118)} = -.14$; p = .87; Fight: $F_{(2,118)} = .05$; 608 p = .95; Flight: $F_{(2,118)} = -.82$; p = .44; Freeze: $F_{(2,118)} = .03$; p = .98). The participants provided written consent to partic-609 610 ipate in the study. The study was approved by the Ethical 611 Committee at the Department of Psychology, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Novi Sad (date: May 27th, 2014). 612

613 A priori power analysis was conducted in G*Power 3.1.9.2 614 (Faul et al., 2007) in order to determine the optimal sample 615 size. Tests for MANOVA global effects (F tests), adjusted for MANCOVA, were performed. The results showed that, 616 617 with three groups, five covariates, and five response variables, assuming $\alpha = .05$, in order to detect an effect 618 of medium size $(f^2(U) = .15)$ with 80% power, total sam-619 ple size of N = 56 participants would be needed, with 620 621 f_c (35, 187.52) = 1.49, λ = 35.34, Wilks U = .56.

622 Procedure

The experimental procedure took place two weeks after the demographic and questionnaire data were gathered. A Social threat induction procedure (STIP) was applied, also 625 known as "The public speech task" (e.g., Bielak & 626 Moscovitch, 2012; Kimbrel, 2008, 2009; Kimbrel et al., 627 2012; Mansell, Clark, Ehlers, & Chen, 1999). Participants' 628 task was to give a presentation on a chosen topic (using a 629 written draft) before a committee who assessed their 630 presentation skills by giving nonverbal feedback to presen-631 ters. Participants were randomly assigned to three experi-632 mental conditions, which differed by the valence of the 633 feedback (nonverbal signals expressed by the committee). 634 The conditions were chosen according to previous studies 635 (Chaikin, Sigler, & Derlega, 1974; Perowne & Mansell, 636 2002; Veljaca & Rapee, 1998), and were named Negative 637 Feedback (NF), Positive Feedback (PF), and Neutral 638 Feedback (NF). The first two conditions included three 639 nonverbal signals each (NF: frowning, shaking head left 640 to right as a sign of disagreement, leaning back as a sign 641 of rejection; PF: smile as a sign of recognition, nodding 642 head as a sign of agreement, leaning forward as a sign of 643 interest and liking), while neutral feedback implied the lack 644 of facial expression and bodily motions. 645

During the experimental procedure, sheets of paper with 646 three topics (1. Violence, 2. Corruption, 3. Proneness to 647 risky behaviors) printed out were administered to partici-648 pants, with the instruction to pick only one topic and write 649 a draft speech in 10 min. After that, the experimenter ran-650 domly took the drafts from the participants, in order for the 651 examiners to randomly call out the students to give 652 speeches. Each of the participants had 1 min to present 653 the topic to the committee, while the examiners "rated 654 public speech skills" by giving nonverbal feedback. The 655 experimenter controlled the timing using a stopwatch. 656

Variable						SPCQ -	SPCQ -			
	BIS	BAS	Fight	Flight	Freeze	cost	probability	AB – th	AB – pl	NMBI
BAS	35***									
Fight	03	.18								
Flight	.48***	11	.05							
Freeze	.58***	29**	15	.46***						
SPCQ – cost	.48***	08	.03	.35***	.47***					
SPCQ – probability	.41***	07	10	.30**	.38***	.73***				
AB – th	.08	12	.07	04	03	10	11			
AB – pl	.16	12	02	.01	05	.05	.09	31**		
NMBI	.03	.01	01	06	.06	.01	.00	.00	.06	
Μ	2.29	2.94	2.42	2.60	1.91	36.04	37.16	-4.01	1.12	-0.21
SD	0.58	0.49	0.62	0.49	0.62	2.58	19.77	23.12	27.96	2.05
α	.78	.72	.82	.50	.77	.96	.95			

Table 5. Experiment 2: Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations (Pearson correlations; two-tailed)

Notes. N = 121. BAS = Behavioral Approach System; BIS = Behavioral Inhibition System; SPCQ - cost = judgmental bias - assessment of cost (negative impact) of events in near future; SPCQ - probability = judgmental bias - assessment of likelihood of negative events in near future; AB - th = attention bias toward threatening stimuli; AB - pl = attention bias toward pleasant stimuli; NMBI = Negative Memory Bias. [Auhtor: please check addition in notes and added zeros for SD value:

The whole procedure lasted approximately 35 min. After
the presentations were completed, the participants from
the same group went to the computer classroom, where
cognitive biases were assessed. This phase lasted 40 min.
The last phase of the experiment was the debriefing.

662 Measures

The same measures as in Experiment 1 were applied. The
only difference was that the instructions were in the past
tense, since it was important to know how the participants
felt in the current situation of social threat.

667 Results

Bivariate correlations (Table 5) suggest that the independents correlate moderately, except for BIS and Freeze,
which show somewhat stronger positive correlation, as well
as two SPCQ variables, which correlate strongly and positively. BIS, Flight, and Freeze correlate moderately and
positively with the two SPCQ variables. Two indexes of
attention bias correlate modestly and negatively.

675 MANCOVA (Table 6) shows that the set of independents explained a substantial amount of variance of SPCQ - cost 676 677 (p < .001) and SPCQ – probability (p < .001). BIS and Freeze 678 contributed positively to prediction of SPCQ - cost. BIS pos-679 itively affected attention biases toward pleasant stimuli, while Freeze was negatively related to attention bias toward 680 pleasant stimuli. While bivariate correlations between 681 attention bias toward pleasant stimuli and BIS as well as 682 683 FFFS were nonsignificant the same relations were signifi-684 cant in the MANCOVA. Namely, in MANCOVA, statistical significance of standardized β coefficient for Freeze is 0.046. This is a marginally statistically significant result and should be taken with reserve. Statistical significance of standardized β coefficient for BIS is 0.022. This result is theoretically implausible and most probably an artifact. This effect may be attributed to outliers. Experimental conditions did not affect any of the dependents. 685686687688689690691

Behavioral parameters for attentional bias (response 692 times – RT) are showed in Tables 7 and 8. 693

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Discussion

Experimentally induced circumstances of social threats, in 695 their own regard, do not affect attentional, memory, or 696 judgmental biases. The situation which was to provoke a 697 real threat was apparently strong enough for the partici-698 pants in all three groups, so that the effect of experimental 699 manipulation did not occur. In other words, preparation of a 700 speech and presentation before the professors is perceived 701 as a consistent social distress regardless of the type of 702 nonverbal feedback. BIS and Freeze have significant effects 703 on judgmental and attention biases. BIS and Freeze are 704 positively related to the assessment of cost of occurrence 705 of undesirable social events, while BIS affects the assess-706 ment of distress. Such effects occur in groups of highly 707 socially anxious individuals in experimental conditions 708 similar to the conditions in this study (Pozo, Carver, 709 Wellens, & Scheier, 1991; Winton, Clark, & Edelmann, 710 1995). However, although this study did not include a group 711 of high-anxiety subjects, it did include a highly provocative 712 situation, which can be perceived as an intense social 713 stressor (the presence of authority and the importance of 714

 \square

Table 6. Experiment 2: Results of MANCOVA[Author: (1) please check, if edits	alues and Notes are correct. (2) Std. Error was replaced with
SE. correct?]	

 \square

	SPCQ - cost	SPCQ – probability	AB – th	AB – pl	NMBI
Variable	Β (β)	Β (β)	Β (β)	Β (β)	Β (β)
BIS	11.06 (.31)**	10.62 (.31)*	5.38 (.14)	13.42 (.28)*	0.17 (.05)
BAS	4.4 (.11)	4.87 (.12)	-6.46 (14)	-4.9 (09)	0.17 (.04)
Fight	2.03 (.06)	-2.89 (09)	3.59 (.10)	-1.43 (03)	0.01 (.00)
Flight	2.44 (.06)	3.33 (.08)	-4.46 (10)	-1.11 (02)	-0.46 (11)
Freeze	9.86 (.30)**	5.63 (.18)	-3.57 (10)	-10.6 (24)*	0.32 (.10)
EC1	2.26 (.09)	1.08 (.04)	3.65 (.13)	-0.81 (02)	-0.19 (07)
EC2	-1.51 (06)	-2.15 (09)	-0.42 (01)	-4.16 (12)	0.00 (.00)
R^2	.31	.23	.05	.08	.02
Adj. <i>R</i> ²	.27	.18	.00	.03	04
F _(2,118)	7.24	4.77	0.94	1.50	0.33
EC1					
Μ	38.81	38.88	-1.07	0.05	-0.41
SD	20.99	19.54	24.24	28.33	2.37
SE	3.28	3.05	3.79	4.42	0.37
EC2					
Μ	34.54	35.10	-4.18	-2.47	-0.19
SD	18.97	18.31	21.42	26.86	1.85
SE	2.96	2.86	3.35	4.19	0.29
EC3			$X X \rightarrow$		
М	34.71	37.53	-6.93	6.62	0.00
SD	21.97	21.71	23.85	28.71	1.92
SE	3.52	3.48	3.82	4.60	0.31
Total					
М	36.04	37.16	-4.01	1.12	-0.21
SD	20.58	19.77	23.12	27.96	2.05
SE	1.87	1.78	2.10	2.54	0.19

Note. N = 121. BIS = Behavioral Inhibition System; BAS = Behavioral Approach System; EC1 – experimental condition 1 as a independent variable (negative feedback); EC2 – experimental condition 2 as a independent variable (positive feedback); EC3 – experimental condition 3 as a independent variable(neutral feedback); Adj. R^2 = [Author: do we need a phation here?]; F = [Author: ple phation here?]; SPCQ – cost = judgmental bias – assessment of cost (negative impact) of events in near future; SPCQ – probability = judgmental bias – assessment of likelihood of negative events in near future; AB – th = attention bias toward threatening stimuli; AB – pl = attention bias toward pleasant stimuli; NMBI = Negative Memory Bias; SPCQ – cost, SPCQ – probability, AB – th, AB – pl, NMBI as dependent variables; B = upstandardized regression coefficients; β = standardized regression coefficients. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. [Author: are p values one- or two-tailed product of the standardized regression coefficients; β = standardized regression coefficients.

Table 7.	Experiment 2:	Behavioral	parameters	for	attentional	bias	(response	times	- RT)

Attentional bias		Min	Max	М	SD	Sk	Ku
RT	RTC_anger	331.41	627.19	432.92	55.92	0.767	0.799
	RTI_anger	323.48	609.48	428.91	57.65	0.724	0.562
	RTC_joy	338.06	597.86	432.61	53.95	0.750	0.713
	RTI_joy	338.61	677.83	433.72	63.51	1.201	2.376
	RT_neutral	408.14	726.32	532.10	69.10	0.583	0.316
Bias indexes	BI_anger	-62.11	58.52	-4.00	23.12	0.312	0.128
	BI_joy	-79.82	81.06	1.12	27.96	0.334	1.153

Note. N = 121. RT = Response Times; RTC_anger = congruent trials for threatening stimuli; RTI_anger = incongruent trials for threatening stimuli; RTC_joy = congruent trials for pleasant stimuli; RTI_joy = incongruent trials for pleasant stimuli; RT_neutral = responses times for neutral stimuli; BI_anger = bias indexes for threatening stimuli; BI______ bias indexes for pleasant stimuli; Sk = Skewness; Ku = Kurtosis. **Fauthor: addit explanations correct? Please check also the added zeros in values Sk and Ku; also provide the significance of bold vaues in Table**

Attentional bias	Group	Min	Max	М	SD	Sk	Ku
RTC_anger	NEGF	354.37	594.80	436.17	57.65	0.944	0.688
	POZF	349.09	552.63	429.81	52.23	0.168	-0.810
	NEUF	331.41	627.19	432.76	59.00	1.053	2.142
RTI_anger	NEGF	341.00	609.48	435.10	59.74	1.047	1.203
	POZF	334.24	556.36	425.63	55.93	0.396	-0.209
	NEUF	323.48	575.84	425.84	58.18	0.707	0.673
RTC_joy	NEGF	359.15	586.53	438.23	54.29	0.955	0.986
	POZF	342.10	552.65	428.48	52.92	0.382	-0.225
	NEUF	338.06	597.86	431.04	55.55	0.950	1.580
RTI_joy	NEGF	338.61	656.50	438.27	70.09	1.211	1.854
	POZF	340.06	554.22	426.01	51.47	0.239	-0.573
	NEUF	343.50	677.83	437.05	68.42	1.490	3.356
RT_neutral	NEGF	416.18	726.32	535.22	72.79	0.945	0.858
	POZF	408.14	650.23	526.50	66.15	0.058	-0.976
	NEUF	413.95	720.95	534.71	69.61	0.636	0.802
BI_anger	NEGF	-45.19	47.39	-1.07	24.24	0.334	-0.537
	POZF	-50.69	58.49	-4.16	21.42	0.351	0.881
	NEUF	-62.11	58.52	-6.93	23.85	0.274	0.538
BI_joy	NEGF	-37.04	81.06	0.05	28.33	1.077	0.892
	POZF	-79.82	45.56	-2.47	26.86	-0.870	1.680
	NEUF	-55.81	80.92	6.02	28.71	0.611	0.957

Table 8. Experiment 2: Behavioral parameters for attentional bias (response times – RT) [Author: please check added zeros in front of values of M, Sk, Ku]

Notes. $N_{\text{NEGF}} = 41$; $N_{\text{POSF}} = 41$; $N_{\text{NEUF}} = 39$. RTC_anger = congruent trials for threatening stimuli; RTL_anger = incongruent trials for threatening stimuli; RTC_joy = congruent trials for pleasant stimuli; RTL_anger = incongruent trials for neutral stimuli; RTL_anger = bias indexes for threatening stimuli; Bl_anger = bias indexes for threatening stimuli; BL_joy = bias indexes for pleasant stimuli; NEGF = Negative Feedback; POZF = Positive Feedback; NEUF = Neutral Feedback. [Author: provide the significance of bold vaues in Table]

their feedback). The emergence of BIS as the primary
positive correlate of threat perception is in line with the
expectations stemming from both MMSA and RST (Corr,
2011; Gray & McNaughton, 2003; Kimbrel, 2008). People
who tend to perceive the environment as potentially threatening and harassing, appear to show pronounced negative
judgmental bias.

722 Behavioral Inhibition System reactivity was a significant positive predictor of attention bias toward pleasant stimuli. 723 724 It is possible that the positive stimuli in the case of real danger may represent an adequate distractor, which 725 726 attracts the attention of people with high BIS. On the other hand, people with high Freeze may perceive pleasant stim-727 728 uli as a disturbing factor that interferes with cognitive pro-729 cesses responsible for the processing of signals of danger.

730 Final Discussion

The overall goal of this study was to explore the differences
in cognitive processes in two different situations, which
provoke potential and real threat. Results are in line with

the basic premises of rRST (Gray & McNaughton, 2003), 734 pointing to the differences between the cognitive processes 735 associated with anxiety and fear. In case of potential 736 threats, the role of cognitive processes is to detect possible 737 inconvenience and distress, whereby BIS plays a key role in 738 shaping of cognitive biases related to the cost of future 739 events. Besides, BIS has a crucial role in the processes of 740 signals of real danger. People with high BIS experience each 741 new situation as an opportunity to scan the environment in 742 search of possible dangers and risks. Differences between 743 potential and actual threats are reflected in different cogni-744 tive processes that are activated under the influence of BIS. 745 In the case of potential threats, BIS contributes to the 746 assessment of cost, while in the circumstances of real 747 threat, it contributes to attention biases as well. 748

749 The role of pleasant stimuli is particularly important for the understanding of attention focus in provocative situa-750 tions. In case of potential threats, pleasant stimuli serve 751 as distractors for people with high Freeze, while in the case 752 of real threats, pleasant stimuli are distractors for people 753 with high BIS. Focusing on positive stimuli in people with 754 high Freeze may point to specific cognitive strategies for 755 coping with potential stress. Positive stimuli serve the same 756

purpose for the people with high BIS in cases of real danger. 757 The results point to the possibility that the type of threat 758 may be a moderator of the effects of BIS and Freeze on 759 760 attention biases to pleasant stimuli. An alternative explana-761 tion for this result is the finding that people with high BIS and Freeze point greater attention to positive stimuli 762 because they are incongruent with the threat that currently 763 occupies their cognitive capacities. Certainly this is a 764 765 provocative result, which raises the question of cognitive 766 processing of positive stimuli in stressful situations.

Importantly, differences between results which are 767 related to effects of personality traits on cognitive biases, 768 769 can be explained by using different assessment methods. 770 In line with this, the judgment biases were assessed by self-reports, whereas attention biases and memory biases 771 772 were measured based on task performance. Therefore, 773 the judgment biases and the personality measures probably share more method variance what could also explain why 774 775 SPCQ was generally more strongly related to rRST 776 constructs. Previous evidence suggests that correlations 777 between personality dimensions and processing of emotional stimuli are small (e.g., Gomez & Gomez, 2002; 778 779 Kerns, 2005; Vermeulen, Luminet, & Corneille, 2006). Therefore, future research should include multi-method 780 assessment of BIS, BAS, and FFFS sensitivity (e.g., 781 behavioral tasks) and measurement of judgmental biases 782 783 based on task performance.

Experimental manipulation affects only the cognitive 784 processes that can be easily modeled under the influence 785 786 of the current circumstances, such as cognitive bias. The lack 787 of any effect on memory processes indicates that short-term effects provoked by experimental conditions were not 788 789 sufficient to cause changes in memory. In other words, it is possible that stressful situations trigger the activity of 790 791 working memory, but not long-term memory.

It should be noted that cognitive biases were measured 792 793 after the threatening situation. For instance, the attentional 794 bias toward positive stimuli in high BIS individuals may also 795 be mediated by feelings of relief that the stressing situation has been overcome. Thus, the two experiments mainly differ 796 797 in the temporal relation between the social threat and 798 cognitive bias assessments. In general, future replication 799 studies may benefit from a full pretest-posttest design, which 800 may help disentangle the effects of temporal factors on all 801 relevant variables.

802 The results point to the complexity of the interplay among situational features, personality traits, and cognitive 803 804 processes. Situations of potential threat seem to engage cognitive processes more than the situations of real threat, 805 possibly due to their more pronounced ambiguity and open-806 807 ness to interpretation. In the situations of real threat, effects 808 of personality traits emerge, probably triggered by the need 809 to overcome present danger.

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